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Introduction
Over the course of the financial and economic crisis, many countries' public finances have been stretched to the breaking point due to bailing out financial institutions and attempting to stabilise the business cycle. The poor state of public finances has raised concerns not only about the solvency of sovereigns, but also in regard to the very survival of the euro area itself, not to mention the process of European integration. As a consequence, many economists and policy-makers are calling for fiscal consolidation, which, in turn, has led to a resurgence of macroeconomic research on the effects on fiscal consolidation and determinants of the likelihood of its success (e.g., IMF, 2010; Perotti, 2011; Alesina et al., 2012) .
However, in many countries, the implementation of consolidation measures has been less than a success, not necessarily due to poorly chosen policies, but because of public opposition to the measures. There is a substantial literature emphasising the importance of public support for economic reforms, suggesting that the success of fiscal consolidation efforts strongly depends on the popularity of the measures to be implemented (see, e.g., the surveys by Rodrik, 1996; Drazen, 2000) . However, most empirical studies focus on support for the introduction of a new economic system or specific economic policies rather than the issue of budget consolidation (e.g., Shiller et al., 1991; Fidrmuc, 2000; Warner, 2001; Hayo, 2004; Valev, 2004) . Hence, there is little research into public attitudes toward fiscal consolidation and different consolidation measures.
To address this issue, we use data from a unique survey of German households conducted on our behalf by Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung (GFK), one of the biggest private German institutes specialising in collecting public opinion data. Fieldwork was done in February 2013 and involved completing a structured questionnaire with the help of pen pads during face-to-face interviews. Our sample is comprised of 2,042 representatively selected German citizens aged 14 or older.
Interviewees were asked questions about the public debt situation in Germany, in particular about their attitudes toward fiscal consolidation, the desired pattern of public debt reduction, and their preferences for different consolidation measures. We collected additional information about the respondents, allowing us to test several theory-based hypotheses concerning determinants of individual attitudes toward fiscal consolidation. The determinants we find to be important include personal economic situation, time preferences, fiscal illusion, trust in politics, and party preferences.
We believe that there are two reasons making Germany an especially interesting country to study in regard to the topic of this paper. First, Germany is the largest economy within the European Union, which is why its fiscal policy decisions might cause notable spillovers to other member countries. Second, of all member countries of the euro area, Germany makes the largest contribution to the European Stability Mechanism (roughly 27%).
Thus, the state of Germany's public finances is of utmost importance for the whole euro area.
Survey data are frequently used to elicit public attitudes toward policy measures. Alesina and Giuliano (2009) , Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) , and Corneo and Grüner (2002) evaluate individual attitudes toward political redistribution utilising cross-country data from the World Values Survey and the International Social Survey Programme. The authors test several hypotheses about preferences for redistribution, especially concerning the impact of current and future income as well as absolute and relative personal income. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) study the same topic using data from the US General Social Survey. Huckley and Harbour (1983) employ a coupon-scale questionnaire to discover individuals' preferences between public expenditures and tax cuts. By forcing respondents to take both public expenditures and revenues into account, the authors circumvent the so-called more for less paradox (Welch, 1985) . Surveys are also used to assess consumers' responses to tax policy changes (e.g., Shapiro and Slemrod, 2001 ). Blinder and Krueger (2004) , as well as Walstad (1997) , use survey data from the United States to examine individual attitudes toward a variety of economic issues, including public deficits. Both studies primarily focus on the role of knowledge and political ideology.
Their findings suggest that opinions on economic policy are significantly affected by a person's factual economic knowledge. Blinder and Holtz-Eakin (1984) use US opinion poll data to elicit individual attitudes toward a proposed balanced budget amendment to the constitution.
To the best of our knowledge, the only survey-based empirical analysis of individual preferences toward fiscal consolidation is provided by Stix (2013) , who uses data from a survey conducted in Austria in 2010. However, there are some important differences between his approach and ours. For example, in Stix's (2013) questionnaire, people were asked to what extent they would reduce public debt assuming that the government will choose the consolidation measures. Given this wording, it seems likely that consolidation preferences are influenced by the respondents' expectations about which measures the government may implement. Circumventing this potential problem, we designed our survey so that the respondents themselves choose the consolidation measures to be implemented. This not only allows us to assess the general feasibility of public debt consolidation, but also to shed light on the specific course policy-makers should adopt to successfully reduce public debt.
Our paper also relates to macro-level studies on the association between governments' fiscal performance and election outcomes. For example, Peltzman (1992) studies voting behaviour in US presidential, senatorial, and gubernatorial elections. His findings suggest that voters punish increases in overall public spending, but not an increasing reliance on deficit spending. On the contrary, Brender and Drazen (2008) find that in developed countries, incurring public deficits significantly reduces the incumbent government's chances of reelection.
The main findings of our paper are as follows. Descriptive statistics show that although the median respondent is in favour of fiscal consolidation in Germany, no specific consolidation measure is supported by a majority. We run (ordered) logit estimations and find that individual attitudes toward fiscal consolidation are affected by various factors. People who are well-off, forward-looking, informed about the costs associated with deficit spending, and who have little faith in the government's ability to appropriately manage tax revenues are significantly more likely to opt for a debt reduction. In contrast, people who regard their personal economic situation as poor, reveal high discount rates, and believe in the government's fiscal competence exhibit a larger likelihood of opposing consolidation efforts.
Preferences for alternative consolidation measures are also systematically related to several explanatory variables. Respondents characterised by high income and social class tend to favour a tax hike, whereas people who have less or no confidence in the fiscal competence of politicians are generally opposed to such a policy measure. Finally, respondents who are particularly concerned about the present situation tend to oppose a reduction of public spending.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the questionnaire and sets forth some descriptive statistics. In Section 3, we study the determinants of individual attitudes toward fiscal consolidation. We discuss our main research hypotheses and present the results of our empirical analysis. In Section 4, we examine public preferences for alternative consolidation measures. Section 5 concludes.
Individual Attitudes Toward Fiscal Consolidation
In democracies, elected politicians are supposed to act in the voters' best interests and according to their preferences. This behaviour is facilitated by regularly scheduled, free elections. In principle, if politicians have been acting in accordance with the voters' interests, they are re-elected, otherwise they are voted out of office. Thus, the likelihood of successfully implementing a political programme is much higher if it matches voters' preferences (Rodrik, 1996; Drazen, 2000) .
In light of economic and political developments in Europe within the past years, two questions are of particular interest: What is the electorate's attitude toward (i) fiscal consolidation in general and (ii) specific consolidation measures? The answers to these questions are important to academic economists, as they may help in formulating and testing relevant theories, and they are also crucial for political decision-makers, as the implementation of concrete consolidation measures has met with remarkably strong public resistance.
The questionnaire contains two questions designed to measure individual attitudes toward fiscal consolidation. First, we ask people whether they think the state should reduce public debt, keep the amount of public debt at the current level, or incur additional public debt. Second, respondents who state that public debt should be reduced are then asked to choose between three alternative debt-reduction paths:
Option A: Debt reduction is distributed evenly over the next years, i.e., in each year a similar amount of debt is reduced. Roughly 70% of interviewees call for a reduction of public debt. One-quarter prefers to keep public debt at its current level and only 1.6% supports an increase in public debt. It thus appears that fiscal consolidation is supported by a vast majority of the German population. This raises the question of which consolidation measure should be implemented.
The success of any fiscal consolidation effort depends not only on the public's attitude toward public debt reduction in general, but also on the popularity of the specific consolidation measures the government plans to adopt. Thus, all respondents who opted for debt reduction were asked which consolidation measure they prefer. The choice was between raising taxes or cutting public spending in one of seven areas: social security, education, public safety, infrastructure, economic development, defence, or miscellaneous. The first six are those on which the German government currently spends the most. Each interviewee could voice a maximum of three preferences, which were ranked. To ensure that differences in respondents' answers are not driven by differences in their information sets, we listed the current amount of public spending devoted to the respective category (in per-capita terms and as a share of total public spending) as well as the most important items in each category measured by the amount of money spent. This is good news for fiscal stabilisation, since expenditure-based fiscal consolidation is associated with lower welfare costs and greater sustainability (Alesina et al., 2012; Alesina and Ardagna, 2010) . Two-thirds of the consolidation-supporting respondents opt for reducing public spending on defence. Preferences for other consolidation measures are more heterogeneously distributed.
Note that the figures in Table 2 are derived only from supporters of fiscal consolidation. Policy-makers, however, might also be interested in whether any specific consolidation measure is supported by the majority of the population. Cutting defence expenditures comes close, though, and a simple majority lies within the 95% confidence bands. However, since only 2.5% of the public budget is devoted to this expense, the potential for reducing public debt by means of cutting defence spending is very limited.
Eliciting Individual Attitudes Toward Fiscal Consolidation
This section sheds light on whether differences between peoples' attitudes toward fiscal consolidation can be attributed to specific characteristics. As a starting point, the public choice and political economy literature puts forward several theories and conjectures about the determinants of individual attitudes toward public indebtedness. However, there is very little empirical evidence as to the usefulness of these approaches. In this section, we discuss some of these claims and describe how we test them empirically. 
Explanatory Variables and Research Hypotheses
The extant public choice and political economics literature contains hypotheses intended to explain why, or under which conditions, voters may tolerate or even support public debt accumulation. Some approaches are well-defined formal theories, others more or less ad hoc.
In this section, we discuss several of these arguments and relate them to items included in our questionnaire.
Economic well-being: Cukierman and Meltzer (1989) Time preference: In Barro's (1979) tax-smoothing hypothesis, deficit spending helps minimise the net present value of the excess burden of taxation. Hence, socially optimal fiscal policy is countercyclical, i.e., a benevolent social planner incurs fiscal deficits during recessions and consolidates the public budget once the economy recovers. However, whether such a course of fiscal policy is in the (representative) voter's interest strongly depends (inter alia) on her time preferences, represented by the shape and parameters of the discount function she applies to evaluate the welfare effect of future fiscal policies. The crucial assumption here is that the discount function applied by the (representative) individual corresponds to the yield curve of government bonds. However, two frequently observed anomalies in empirical intertemporal choice research challenge this view. First, people's subjective discount factors between two consecutive periods are typically larger than the corresponding interest rate, indicating that they are less forward-looking than they are assumed to be. Second, people are especially impatient in the short run, commonly referred to as 'myopia' (e.g., Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; Ainslie, 1975) . These two anomalies are typically illustrated by means of a quasi-hyperbolic discount function, with W indicating an individual's welfare and u her utility from consuming good x at time t and in different future periods t + i (i = 1,…,N):
represents the subjective discount rate between two consecutive future periods, i.e., the individual degree of forward-lookingness, and measures the degree of short-run impatience. A quasi-hyperbolic discount function is frequently applied in theoretical and empirical setups and describes individual intertemporal decision-making quite well (e.g., Angeletos et al., 2001; Laibson, 1997) . However, a lack of forward-lookingness and short-run impatience could also be an important determinant of public indebtedness. Huber and Runkel (2008) show that when hyperbolic discounting is applied in the context of the Barro (1979) model, a benevolent social planner will persistently accumulate public debt, and the size of the deficit is inversely related to the discount factor.
We conduct two 'experiments' to elicit the interviewees' time preferences. In the first experiment, respondents are asked to choose between a safe payoff of €1,000 paid immediately and a higher payoff of €X i,6 paid in six months. In the second experiment, the choice is between a safe payoff of €1,000 paid in six months and a higher payoff of €X i,12
paid in 12 months. 3 The respondents' choices of X i,6 and X i,12 can then be used to calculate and (cf. Angeletos et al., 2001; Laibson, 1997 ):
Accordingly, our second hypothesis is:
H2: The smaller an individual's subjective discount rate ( ) and short-run patience ( ), the greater her propensity toward public indebtedness.
Information set: Survey evidence documents that knowledge about economic facts shapes a person's opinion of economic policy (Blinder and Krueger, 2004; Walstad, 1997) .
Hence, factual knowledge may also affect individual attitudes toward fiscal consolidation.
One of the earliest arguments made in the public choice literature to explain the electorate's apparent debt tolerance is that voters may suffer from 'fiscal illusion', i.e., they lack information about the future costs associated with deficit spending (e.g., Buchanan and Wagner, 1977) . Arguably, being able to accurately assess the costs of deficit financing presupposes that voters have sufficient knowledge about the economy. Factual knowledge about debt-related economic measures may be a good way of capturing the degree of fiscal illusion. We employ three multiple-choice questions in order to test the interviewees' knowledge. We ask about (i) the size of the federal government's budget deficit in 2012 (in relation to GDP), (ii) the current interest rate on government bonds with a maturity of 10 years, and (iii) 2012's inflation rate. In each case, respondents can choose between four answers. In the subsequent empirical analysis, we employ dummy variables for the number of correct answers to assess the influence of factual knowledge on attitudes toward fiscal consolidation. We expect that those who are better informed are more debt averse, as they have a better understanding of the costs of public debt.
H3: (Factual) knowledge about the costs associated with deficit spending increases public debt aversion.
Believed fiscal position: Subjective assessment of economic conditions by economic agents may play an important role as well, as people tend to act on the information set they have, at least as long as they perceive it to be reasonably accurate. Thus, on the one hand, if a person believes that debt-servicing costs or the previous year's deficit are low, she may be more tolerant of incurring additional public debt. On the other hand, if a person thinks that the government is spending beyond its limits, she may be more likely to support fiscal consolidation. We use the answers to the knowledge multiple-choice questions as an indicator for the respondents' beliefs about the realisation of debt-related economic measures, irrespective of whether they are actually correct.
H4: The larger a person believes the previous year's deficit as well as debt-servicing
costs to be, the greater her public debt aversion.
Trust in politicians:
Several political economy approaches assume that public debt is used as a strategic instrument by opportunistic policy-makers to pursue selfish interests. These approaches include political budget cycle theory and rent-seeking approaches, as well as work by Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and Tabellini (1990) Party preference: A widespread conjecture is that public debt incurrence is associated with the government's political ideology-i.e., leftist governments are supposed to be more inclined to rely on deficit spending than are their right-wing counterparts (e.g., Buchanan and Wagner, 1977) . Accordingly, supporters of leftist parties may be more tolerant of public indebtedness than supporters of conservative parties. We account for party preferences by asking interviewees for which party they would vote if elections were held next Sunday. The interviewees choose between the seven most popular parties in Germany. Alternatively, they can state that they 'would vote for a different party' or 'would not vote at all'.
H6: Supporters of leftist parties are more likely to oppose fiscal consolidation than are supporters of conservative parties.
Empirical Approach
We now conduct an empirical investigation into the determinants of individual attitudes toward fiscal consolidation by considering the following model:
The dependent variable is the debt-propensity measure introduced in Section 2.1. To estimate Equation (1), we assume that F(.) corresponds to the distribution function of the logistic distribution, which yields an ordered logit model. We apply maximum likelihood estimation. €X or taking part in a lottery in which they could win either €1,000 or nothing (odds are 50:50). The choice of X is then used to compute an individual's risk preference parameter, which varies between −1 (maximum risk aversion) and +1 (maximum risk propensity). 
Results
The estimation results from the ordered logit model explaining individual attitudes toward fiscal consolidation are presented in Table 4 . The second column contains the estimated parameters of the latent variable model; columns 3-7 show the average marginal effects for each realisation of the debt-propensity indicator. Our findings are as follows. 4 In our sample, we observe an unexpectedly high number of respondents who choose the immediate payment irrespective of what future payoff they are offered. Interestingly, a similar distribution of answers is found in the SOEP. A possible explanation for this finding is that respondents who are particularly risk averse chose this option. To control for possible spill-over effects and measurement errors, we include additional dummy variables for these categories. 5 All explanatory variables are described in greater detail in Appendix A.1. 6 The risk preference parameter is computed as −500
500
. The setup of the experiment is described in detail in Appendix A.2. White (1980) robust standard errors are used. Average marginal effects for β and δ are calculated based on change of the respective variable from the lower to the upper bound of the 66% confidence interval. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
H1: Economic situation:
We find that subjective economic well-being and property ownership, our wealth indicator, have a statistically significant and theory-consistent impact on attitudes toward fiscal consolidation. The marginal effects appear to be of notable size. A one-unit increase in the subjective assessment of personal economic situation increases the likelihood of opting for a large immediate debt reduction by about 2.5 percentage points (pp) and for an even reduction of debt over time by about 1.7 pp; in contrast, the likelihood of opposing a reduction in public debt decreases by more than 3 pp. Likewise, homeowners are 3 pp more likely to favour immediate consolidation and 4 pp less likely to prefer an unchanged public debt level. Household income and the social class indicator have no significant impact on the debt-propensity indicator. We check the robustness of our finding by considering the monthly net personal income of the respondent instead of household income. Moreover, we replace the income measures with income quartiles and quintiles to investigate the importance of relative income effects. Our results do not change notably.
H2: Time preference:
An increase in β and δ, i.e., lower discount rate and greater patience, leads to a significantly higher likelihood of supporting immediate fiscal consolidation as well as an even reduction of debt over time. Respondents with lower subjective discount rates and greater short-run impatience are more likely to either oppose consolidation efforts or to put off debt reduction to the future. Note that since both β and δ can vary only between 0 and 1, common marginal effects are of limited interpretative value since they refer to a one-unit increase in the respective right-hand side variable. For this reason, we compute marginal effects based on a change from the lower to the upper bound of the 66% confidence interval of β and δ (corresponding to a two-standard-deviation increase). A twostandard-deviation increase in β (δ) increases the likelihood of favouring an immediate debt reduction by about 3.5 pp (3 pp); in contrast, the likelihood of opposing such a reduction decreases by almost 5 pp (4 pp). Thus, our findings fully confirm hypothesis H2, in which a lack of future orientation or myopia is expected to be an important source of voters' debt tolerance.
H3: Information set:
We find that respondents who are informed about the (future) costs of deficit spending are more debt averse, supporting the fiscal illusion argument. The larger the number of correct answers to the three multiple-choice questions, i.e., the better the factual knowledge about debt-related economic measures, the greater the respondent's public debt aversion. The effects are of a notable size: respondents giving one/two/three correct answers are 3.9 pp/5.4 pp/9.5 pp more likely to support prompt consolidation and 5.8 pp/7.6 pp/11.7 pp less likely to prefer public debt at its current level. A few control variables have significant effects: an egalitarian ideology is associated with stronger support for fiscal consolidation and East Germans are significantly more likely to oppose public debt reduction than are West Germans.
Individual Attitudes Toward Alternative Consolidation Policies
As shown in Section 2, preferences for alternative consolidation policies show remarkable variation. In this section, we use two approaches to investigate whether the observed differences are associated with specific individual characteristics. First, we consider only the respondents' first choices and estimate a multinominal logit model with 'tax hike' as a base category. Second, we investigate whether a specific consolidation measure is mentioned at all by estimating eight binary choice logit models, one for each consolidation measure. The binary dependent variables take the value 1 if the respective measure was mentioned; 0 otherwise. As regressors, we employ the same variables as in the previous analysis (cf. Section 2.3). Our analysis is explorative, as there is no well-defined theory from which testable hypotheses can be derived.
The estimation results are presented in Tables A1 and A2 People who are particularly concerned about the present situation oppose a reduction in public spending on economic development and defence. The former effect is intuitive as, e.g., spending on business cycle stabilisation falls into this category. In other words, this finding suggests that people with low discount rates are especially concerned about the present state of the economy.
Trust in politicians has a significant influence on the preferences for different consolidation measures. As one might expect, people who do not have confidence in the fiscal competence of politicians are less likely to opt for a tax hike than those who believe that the government manages tax revenues conscientiously. The distrustful prefer spending cuts, especially in the areas of economic development and defence, which can be interpreted as the belief that tax revenues are wasted in these categories. The distrustful are significantly less likely to favour cutting public spending on social security, which suggests that they do not seem to think that tax revenues are wasted in this area.
The respondents' political orientation also appears to be important, at least with respect to the most preferred consolidation measure. Voters of parties other than those listed prefer cutting spending on any policy area over tax hikes in first place.
Concluding Remarks
The poor state of public finances in many countries has led to calls for fiscal consolidation.
However, debt-reduction plans have often met with stiff public resistance, which is why many governments seem to avoid adopting concrete consolidation measures. This paper identifies the determinants of individual attitudes toward fiscal consolidation and alternative consolidation measures. More precisely, we examine the role of various factors derived from theory-informed hypotheses, namely, personal economic well-being, time preference, fiscal illusion, trust in politicians, and party preference.
Our results support many of the conjectures found in the public choice and political economy literature. People are more likely to support fiscal consolidation the better their economic situation, the more forward-looking and patient they are, the better their knowledge about the costs of deficit spending, and the lower their trust in the government's fiscal competence. However, opinions about the 'appropriate' fiscal adjustment path diverge widely, which is bad news for policy-makers trying to obtain public support for their policies. There is no sign, though, that preferences for alternative consolidation measures are significantly affected by selfish interests, i.e., well-off people prefer tax hikes over almost any alternative consolidation measure, even over spending cuts in social security.
At least two issues are not addressed in our analysis. First, it is debatable whether all respondents who claim to be in favour of public debt reduction can be regarded as 'serious' consolidation supporters. Although 70% of the German population supports fiscal consolidation, 8% state that the main part of public debt should be reduced at some (unspecified) time in the future, and 13% refuse to specify concrete consolidation measures.
This suggests that about 20% of respondents do not take the public budget constraint into account when voicing their opinion, i.e., they support a policy measure only if it involves no costs.
Second, less than 10% of the respondents know the previous year's budget deficit.
This suggests that citizens either (i) find it difficult to acquire this information, (ii) are not overly concerned about acquiring information about public deficits, or (iii) do not believe this specific information to be particularly important for their well-being. Further research is needed to differentiate between these alternative interpretations.
A.1. Explanatory Variables

HH income
Monthly net household income in €1,000. In the raw dataset, households are sorted into one of 11 income classes. In the empirical analysis, we consider the centre of each class.
Subjective well-being Subjective assessment of personal economic well-being, ranging from 1 (absolutely dissatisfied) to 5 (absolutely satisfied).
Social class
Indicator combining information about respondents' relative income and occupational status and ranging from 1 (lower class) to 5 (upper class). choose between a certain payoff of €1,000, which is paid to you immediately and a higher certain payoff, which will be paid to you in 6 months.
You start in row 1 and then proceed row by row. In each row, please choose between the payoff of €1,000 to be paid immediately (column A) and the higher payoff to be paid in 6 months (column B). The payoff on the left remains the same in all rows. Only the payoff on the right increases from row to row. choose between a certain payoff of €1,000, which is paid to you in 6 months and a higher certain payoff, which will be paid to you in 12 months.
You start in row 1 and then proceed row by row. In each row, please choose between the payoff of €1,000 to be paid in 6 months (column A) and the higher payoff to be paid in 12 months (column B). The payoff on the left remains the same in all rows. Only the payoff on the right increases from row to row. Option B was first chosen in row number: Note: Results are based on a maximum likelihood, multinominal logit estimation. The reference category is 'tax hike'. White (1980) robust standard errors are used. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. White (1980) robust standard errors are used. Average marginal effects for β and δ are calculated based on change of the respective variable from the lower to the upper bound of the 66% confidence interval. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
A.3. Individual Attitudes Toward Alternative Consolidation Policies
